Hunt playbook
Abnormal HMI Communication
Detect HMIs communicating with unusual peers, services or destinations.
IntermediateT0885T0884
Hypothesis
An HMI may be communicating outside its established peer set.
Why this hunt matters
An HMI is a trusted control-capable endpoint; its network behaviour is normally extremely predictable.
Scope
Assets: hmi, scada-server, plc
Protocols: modbus-tcp, s7comm, opc-ua
Data sources required
- Network metadata
- Endpoint logs
- Proxy/DNS logs if applicable
Baseline needed first
- Each HMI contacts a fixed set of controllers and servers, and nothing else
Hunt steps
- 01Build a per-HMI peer profile over a stable historical period
- 02Compare the current period and list new peers or services
- 03Investigate any external or enterprise-side destination
- 04Check endpoint logs for newly executed processes around the first occurrence
Indicators of interest
- DNS or HTTP traffic from an HMI
- New controller peers
- Remote management services enabled
- Traffic during unstaffed hours
Triage
- Was software installed or updated?
- Is the account used at the console expected?
- Did the HMI issue any control action?
Likely false positives
- Patch deployment
- Vendor support sessions
- Added process areas
Escalation
- Internet-bound traffic
- New peers combined with control writes
Containment options
- Coordinate with operations — an HMI is required for safe operation; do not isolate casually
Validation
- Peer allow-list defined
- Unnecessary services removed
Why should I care?
Containment in OT is a joint decision. Isolating a device can be the safest action or the one that stops production — operations decides, security advises.