Hunt playbook
Time Synchronisation Manipulation
Detect changes to time sources or unexplained clock offsets across OT systems.
AdvancedT0885T0837
Hypothesis
Time sources or device clocks may have been altered.
Why this hunt matters
Reliable time underpins event correlation, protection schemes and forensic reconstruction.
Scope
Assets: time-server, ied, scada-server, historian
Protocols: dnp3, iec-60870-5-104
Data sources required
- Time server logs
- Device clock offset reporting
- Configuration baselines
- Protocol time-sync commands in network data
Baseline needed first
- A single internal time hierarchy; offsets within defined tolerances
Hunt steps
- 01Collect configured time sources per device and diff against the standard
- 02Review offset and step-change events across OT systems
- 03Search network data for time-sync commands from unexpected sources
- 04Check whether log timestamps across systems still correlate
Indicators of interest
- Devices pointing at external time sources
- Sudden clock steps
- Time-sync commands from non-master hosts
- Log correlation breaking down
Triage
- Did a protection or sequencing function depend on the affected clock?
- Was the change part of maintenance?
- Which systems drifted?
Likely false positives
- GPS antenna faults
- Planned time source migration
- Leap second handling
Escalation
- Time changes on protection or safety-related devices
- Changes coinciding with other suspicious activity
Containment options
- Restore correct time carefully — abrupt steps can affect sequencing and protection functions
Validation
- Time hierarchy documented
- Offset alerting implemented
Why should I care?
Containment in OT is a joint decision. Isolating a device can be the safest action or the one that stops production — operations decides, security advises.